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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW  
AND AUDIT PRACTICE OF EU FUNDS 
KOEN LENAERTS / ALEX BRENNINKMEIJER** 
INTRODUCTION 
THE European Union (EU) “is based on the rule of law”1. According 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), this means that 
the acts of the EU institutions have to comply “with EU law and, in 
particular, with the Treaty [provisions] and the general principles of 
[EU] law”2. 
The general principles of EU law are thus an essential part of the 
body of that law. These principles have been drawn by the ECJ 
mainly from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States. General principles of EU law therefore normally have a coun-
terpart in the national laws of the Member States. One may think, 
for example, of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
sex and sexual orientation, the principle of proportionality, the prin-
ciple of legal certainty, etc. which are guaranteed in both the na-
tional and EU legal orders. 
                                                        
 President of the Court of Justice of the European Union and professor 
of European law at the University of Leuven. All opinions expressed 
herein are strictly personal to the authors. 
** Member of the European Court of Auditors and professor on institu-
tional aspects of the rule of law at Utrecht University School of Law 
1 ECJ, E and F, C-550/09, EU:C:2010:382, para. 44; see also ECJ, Les 
Verts v. European Parliament, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23. 
2 Ibid. 
816 K. Lenaerts / A. Brenninkmeijer 
 
 
The European Court of Auditors (the “ECA”) is an institution of 
the European Union3 and must, in the performance of its tasks, re-
spect these general principles of EU law. The general principles of 
EU law that are most relevant to the daily tasks of auditors are the 
principle of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions, the principle of proportionality, the principle of transparency 
and the right to privacy, as well as principles of good administra-
tion. 
Those general principles of EU law are well-known in the admini-
stration of justice and in public administration. In the daily activi-
ties of auditors they are, to a certain extent, overshadowed by the 
emphasis placed on audit standards. This article examines a number 
of general principles of EU law and describes their application in 
the field of auditing by reference to the activities of the ECA. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW: SOURCES AND STATUS 
In terms of the hierarchy of norms, general principles of EU law 
rank on the same level as the EU Treaties, the highest source of 
law, as was recognised in the seminal Les Verts case4. That case 
was regarded as important by lawyers, both inside and outside the 
European Union, because it was the first explicit judicial acknowl-
edgement that the then “Community” was based on the rule of law. 
This meant that all actions of the EU institutions had to comply 
with EU law, in particular with primary or Treaty law, as well as 
with general principles of EU law5. Thus, today one can say that 
general principles of EU law are just as important as Treaty obliga-
tions and that together they constitute the core of EU law. In prac-
tice, however, those who have to apply those general principles, for 
example in everyday audit practices, do not always pay sufficiently 
close attention to the need for such application. 
                                                        
3 See Article 13 TEU. 
4 ECJ, Les Verts v. European Parliament, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166. 
5 Ibid., para. 23. 
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LOOKING FOR GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AUDIT 
Feedback from beneficiaries of EU programmes raises questions 
as to which general principles of EU law are relevant to audit and as 
to the source of those principles. Principles of good audit need to 
comply with a range of general principles of EU law. For example, 
the principle of legal certainty requires that the effects of audit rules 
be clear, precise and predictable6. But is this actually the case in 
practice? Let us take an example. A research institute is the benefi-
ciary of EU funding. The use made of that funding is not only veri-
fied by the institute’s own auditors and professional project manag-
ers, but also by auditors working on behalf of the European Com-
mission hired from private accountancy firms. Initially, no concerns 
are raised with the research institute regarding its financial over-
sight and administration. After several years of research work, an-
other auditor raises serious objections concerning the calculation of 
the overhead costs of the project, to the surprise and consternation 
of the beneficiary, who has acted in good faith at all times7. The 
beneficiary asks the auditor to indicate precisely how the relevant 
norms or rules are to be interpreted and why he was initially con-
sidered to be in compliance, then not in compliance, with them; he 
also wishes to know on the basis of which audit practice objections 
are now being raised. If the answer is that “these audit practices are 
secret” or “we are independent and make our own judgments”, or in-
deed that “the rules are the rules”, then we submit that such an audit 
practice would not only cause intense frustration to the institute that 
is subject to the audit but would also give rise to a serious threat to 
legal certainty. From the beneficiary’s perspective, whilst compli-
ance with proper auditing standards is both necessary and legiti-
mate, it has a need and indeed a right to know in advance exactly 
what the applicable rules are and how they will be interpreted by 
                                                        
6 ECJ, European Parliament v. Council, C-48/14, EU:C:2015:91, 
para. 45 and the case law cited. 
7 For the purposes of our hypothetical example, it is assumed that the 
beneficiary acts in good faith and is therefore willing to comply with the 
rules, unlike a beneficiary who is not acting in good faith. 
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whichever auditors are appointed to examine their accounts, espe-
cially where one set of auditors succeeds another. The question thus 
arises of how compliance with legal certainty as a general principle 
of EU law is secured, for example by its incorporation into princi-
ples of good audit. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW: TRIPLE FUNCTION8 
General principles of EU law originating from European consti-
tutional traditions have three distinct, yet related, functions in the 
EU legal order. 
 
1. Firstly, they have enabled the ECJ to fill normative gaps 
left by the authors of the Treaties or legislators, in the case 
of secondary legislation. This was of particular importance 
at the initial stages of development of the EU legal system 
when legislation was sometimes incomplete, thus leaving 
wide room for interpretation - or misinterpretation - and 
creating legal uncertainty. Consequently, general principles 
of EU law were instrumental in the development of the EU 
legal system. They enabled the ECJ to ensure that system’s 
autonomy as a self-standing system of law and to promote 
much-needed coherence and unity within it. 
 
2. Secondly, general principles of EU law have served as an 
aid to the interpretation of substantive rules of law. In prac-
tice, this means that primary, secondary as well as national 
implementing legislation must be interpreted in light of 
those principles, thus contributing to the coherence of the 
                                                        
8 See K. LENAERTS / J.A. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, The constitutional alloca-
tion of powers and general principles of EU law (2010) 47 Common Mar-
ket Law Review 1629. 
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EU legal system and avoiding divergent interpretations of 
certain rules9. 
 
3. Thirdly, these principles can also provide grounds for judi-
cial review. EU legislation that breaches a general principle 
of EU law is to be held void10. 
 
Certain general principles of EU law such as the principle of 
transparency, the right to privacy and principles of good admini-
stration are also reflected in specific provisions of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights11, which itself has the same legal value as the 
Treaties12. Acts of the EU institutions that interfere with the exer-
cise of those rights must be provided by law, must respect the es-
sence of the right and must have due regard to the principle of pro-
portionality. 
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION 
Principles of good administration exist both in the legal systems 
of the Member States and at European Union level. Today, they de-
rive in part from case law, in part from the consolidation of earlier 
case law in constitutional or legislative texts. In this respect, Arti-
cle 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - which acquired the 
status of a binding primary law provision with the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty - marks an important step in the development 
of general principles of good administration in EU law. Article 41 
explicitly provides for the “right to good administration”, which en-
                                                        
9 See, with regard to the principle of equal treatment, ECJ, Sturgeon and 
Others, C-402/07 and 432/07, EU:C:2009:716, paras 48 and 60. 
10 See ECJ, Commission v. Kadi and Others, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P 
and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, para. 67. 
11 See Articles 7 (respect for private and family life), 41 (right to good 
administration) and 42 (right of access to documents) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
12 Article 6(1) TEU. 
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compasses the right for a person to have his or her affairs handled 
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions 
and bodies of the Union and which includes, among other things, 
the right to be heard and the right of a person to have access to his 
or her file. The right to be heard implies, in turn, that fair and rea-
sonable deadlines should be granted to individuals in order to allow 
for the effective exercise of this right. 
More generally, the principles of good administration encompass 
not only the “right to good administration” and its related rights, as 
provided for by Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
but also, more broadly, other related principles of law. In the first 
place, mention must be made of the principle of proportionality, on 
the basis of which, in broad terms, the means employed should be 
appropriate with regard to the objectives to be achieved13. Secondly, 
the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations are of 
particular importance in order to ensure ‘good administration’ since 
individuals are entitled to know in advance the rules which are ap-
plicable to them, so that they may order their affairs accordingly. 
Those general principles are applicable to any action taken by the 
EU institutions, agencies and other bodies and they complement the 
laws and rules which are adopted in specific fields. Individuals have 
the right to be treated in accordance with those principles in the 
preparation or execution of any action of the EU institutions or of 
agents acting in their name. This means that internal and external 
auditors acting on behalf of the Commission, as well as the ECA it-
self, are bound by these principles when performing the tasks as-
signed to them. The complexity of the EU’s organisation and man-
agement means that many other entities are involved in administra-
tion on the EU’s behalf and they too are therefore subject to those 
same general principles of EU law. For instance, many EU pro-
grammes are executed jointly under systems of shared management 
by EU institutions and other bodies in collaboration with national 
                                                        
13 The proportionality principle has a much broader scope, as it is laid 
down in Article 5 of the TEU. The criteria for applying this Article are set 
out in the Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiar-
ity and proportionality annexed to the Treaties. 
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authorities in the Member States. Those national authorities and 
related administrative bodies must also act in conformity with those 
general principles of EU administrative law when carrying out tasks 
that fall within the scope of EU law. 
Having established which general principles of EU law are most 
relevant to the operations of the ECA and examined both the source 
of those principles and the means by which they are enshrined in 
EU law, we may proceed to study certain of them in more detail, as 
they are applicable to the activities of auditors, in the search for EU 
principles of good audit. 
THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL CERTAINTY  
AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
The principle of legal certainty has been recognised as one of the 
general principles of EU law by the ECJ since the 60s14. This prin-
ciple is a cornerstone of a system based on the rule of law as indi-
viduals need to know precisely what their rights and obligations are. 
In that regard, this general principle requires all legislative or ad-
ministrative action to meet certain conditions. Firstly, the effects of 
any rule need to be precise. Secondly, they need to be clear. Thirdly, 
and finally, they must be predictable. Furthermore, although this is 
not normally mentioned as a separate condition, it is self-evident 
that rules of law also need to be publicly available in order to en-
sure legal certainty for subjects of the law. 
In that regard, a judgment of the General Court of the European 
Union (the “EGC”)15 neatly illustrates the importance of the unam-
biguity of rules of law16. The case related to a Commission decision 
refusing a refund on anti-dumping duties. The applicant argued, in 
                                                        
14 ECJ, Société Nouvelle des Usines de Pontlieue Aciéries du Temple 
(SNUPAT) v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
32/58 and 33/58, EU:C:1959:18. 
15 Formerly the Court of First Instance of the European Communities 
(the “CFI”). 
16 EGC, Beco v. Commission, T-81/12, EU:T:2014:71  
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particular, that the Commission’s interpretative notice, on which 
that decision relied, was ambiguous and therefore in breach of the 
principle of legal certainty with regard to the time-limits for apply-
ing for such a refund. The EGC indeed found that the interpretative 
notice contained an internal contradiction on a key point relevant to 
the applicant’s claim for a refund and therefore held that the notice 
‘which is nevertheless intended to give clarification to economic op-
erators about the procedure for refunds of anti-dumping duties, and 
to increase their legal certainty, achieves the opposite result’. On 
that basis, the decision of the Commission was annulled by the 
EGC since it did not comply with the general principle of legal cer-
tainty. 
Another important element of the principle of legal certainty is 
consistency. Indeed, where rules are applied in an inconsistent man-
ner that inconsistency may not only be at odds with the principle of 
legal certainty but may also lead to a breach of the principle of 
equal treatment. But what happens if an institution decides to 
change certain rules? Surely it must be allowed to do so? In princi-
ple, yes it may, provided that it does not apply the new rules retro-
actively. To illustrate that point, another case may be cited. It re-
lated to a grant of State aid in the steel sector17. The Commission 
adopted a code in which it set out the conditions under which a 
Member State could grant aid to steel companies. The Commission 
then decided to change this code and to apply those changes retro-
actively, applying the new rules to aid that had already been paid 
out while the previous steel code was in force. The ECJ ruled that 
such retroactive application of the Commission’s new code violated 
the principle of legal certainty. Thus, this case supports the propo-
sition that the principle of legal certainty precludes EU measures 
from taking effect from a point in time prior to their publication. 
Nevertheless, there are certain circumstances under which such 
retroactive application may be justified. These situations are those 
in which the purpose to be achieved requires the retroactive appli-
                                                        
17 ECJ, Falck and Acciaire di Bolzano v. Commission, C-74/00 P and  
C-75/00 P, EU:C:2002:524. 
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cation of a measure, notwithstanding the fact that the legitimate ex-
pectations of those concerned must still be respected. Such a sce-
nario arose in a case where the Commission had decided to adopt a 
new method of calculating fines to be imposed on undertakings for 
infringements of EU competition law rules. The new method would 
increase the amount to be paid in fines and was applied to infringe-
ments that occurred before the new regime came into force. In this 
instance, the ECJ held that this was necessary in order to implement 
competition policy effectively and that it did not violate the legiti-
mate expectations of those concerned. This exception to the general 
rule of non-retroactivity was accepted by the ECJ specifically be-
cause it was deemed necessary for the achievement of the objective 
being pursued - the effectiveness of competition fines, whose level 
the Commission remains free to adjust in accordance with its com-
petition policy. Such changes were therefore foreseeable for the 
economic operators affected and did not consequently breach their 
legitimate expectations18.  
The Lagardère case19, also relating to competition law, once 
again confirms the exceptional nature of the retroactive application 
of measures. This case concerned a Commission decision declaring 
a merger to be compatible with the internal market. However, three 
weeks later the Commission notified the parties that a decision 
amending the preceding decision had been issued following an er-
ror. The new decision stated that certain contractual clauses were no 
longer to be regarded as ancillary to the merger, meaning that they 
were not covered by the approval decision. The CFI, as it then was, 
declared the withdrawal of the original decision to be unlawful, 
since only illegal administrative acts may be withdrawn retrospec-
tively, such withdrawal being subject, moreover, to strict condi-
tions. Thus, withdrawal of the decision would only have been pos-
sible if it had taken place within a reasonable time, if there had been 
                                                        
18 ECJ, Dansk Rorindustri and Others v. Commission, C-189/02 P,  
C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02P, EU: C:2005:408, 
paras 226-232. 
19 CFI, Lagardère and Canal+ v. Commission, T-251/00, 
EU:T:2002:278.  
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reasons to believe that its lawfulness was in question and provided 
that the Commission had sufficient regard to how far the parties 
concerned might have been led to rely on the lawfulness of the 
measure. Since those conditions were not satisfied, the original de-
cision declaring the merger to be compatible with the internal mar-
ket could not be withdrawn. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW  
AND INTERNATIONAL AUDIT STANDARDS 
How do these general principles of EU law apply to the world of 
audit? As mentioned in the introduction, legal certainty plays an im-
portant role given that the ECA’s activities can have consequences 
for both institutions and individuals. For example, if it is found that 
a certain transaction has been affected by an error or irregularity, 
the auditors will forward this to the competent authorities, normally 
the Commission, which will be responsible for recovering the 
money, or to OLAF, which will conduct an investigation in cases of 
fraud. In this sense it is important for the beneficiaries of EU aid to 
be certain of their rights and obligations, particularly where a with-
drawal of benefits is likely to be imposed, since this may have dev-
astating consequences for a beneficiary of an EU programme, po-
tentially leading to bankruptcy in some cases. 
As was explained above, the EU’s legal system is based on the 
rule of law which means that its institutions have to comply both 
with the Treaties and with general principles of EU law. The ECA 
is no exception. Therefore, as a starting point, it is crucial to es-
tablish which rules apply to its activities. The ECA conducts its 
audits in accordance with international standards on auditing issued 
by the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTOSAI). These standards often derive from rules developed as 
informal or ‘soft’ law on the basis of international cooperation. For 
internal auditors, for example, the Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA) has enacted Standards for the professional practice of internal 
auditing. For external audits by Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) 
INTOSAI has enacted International Standards of Supreme Audit 
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Institutions (ISSAIs). Furthermore, the principles and detailed rules 
governing the ECA’s approach to auditing are set out in a set of 
manuals, standards and guidelines. One may observe that the ECA’s 
operations are not governed by rules of law sensu stricto but rather 
by self-imposed policy rules derived from generally-accepted au-
diting practice. This is because the standards that the ECA applies 
are not set by the EU legislator but are rather derived from interna-
tionally applicable standards. As such, the fact that self-imposed 
policy rules apply to the operations of the ECA does not raise con-
cerns from a legal certainty point of view as long as the rules are 
clear, precise and foreseeable. If the rules that the ECA applies to 
its activities are publicly available and are unambiguous, then those 
conditions are fulfilled. However, compliance with the principle of 
legal certainty also requires that those self-imposed rules should be 
applied in a consistent manner. Otherwise, the ECA would run the 
risk of breaching not only the principle of legal certainty but also 
the principle of equal treatment20. Such inconsistent application 
would mean that the rules applied were no longer predictable and, 
furthermore, that they were not the same for everyone. 
This does not mean that the ECA is prevented from changing its 
own auditing standards. It does mean, however, that when it decides 
to do so, the new standards cannot, in principle, be applied retroac-
tively. This principle applies not only to audit standards as such, but 
also to the interpretation given to the rules that auditors use in as-
sessing whether the European Commission or the beneficiaries of 
EU funds have complied with EU law. 
What would happen if the ECA reconsidered a previous statement 
made with regard to the reliability of certain accounts? Would such 
a ‘reconsideration’ violate the general principles of EU law, more 
particularly the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expecta-
tions, if it were to call into question a right previously recognised 
under EU law, as in the above-mentioned Lagardère case in rela-
                                                        
20 ECJ, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v. Commission, C-89/02 P,  
C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, 
para. 211; ECJ, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco 
Privado Português, C-667/13, EU:C:2015:151, para. 69. 
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tion to the Commission? In that instance, the fact that a measure 
was not illegal precluded the Commission from simply withdrawing 
the decision granting an undertaking a particular right, namely the 
approval of its proposed merger. It is submitted that, by analogy, 
this should also be the case for ECA activities and decisions. How-
ever, until now there have not been any cases before the EU courts 
concerning the application of the legal certainty principle to ECA 
findings. 
Furthermore, it is legitimate to ask what should happen if, as in 
the above-mentioned example concerning EU funding, an auditor is 
hired by the Commission to conduct certain audits and the benefici-
ary does not know, for instance, what standards that auditor will be 
applying? It is submitted that this would directly contravene the 
principle of legal certainty as it applies to the beneficiary. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The principle of proportionality, like the principle of subsidiarity, 
governs the exercise by the EU of its powers. It aims to set specific 
boundaries which the actions of the EU institutions must not ex-
ceed. The principle is laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU) and it establishes that any action of the EU must 
be limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties. This means that both the content and the form of EU ac-
tions must directly relate to the aim pursued and must be appropri-
ate to achieve that aim without going beyond what is necessary. 
An exhaustive analysis of the proportionality principle falls out-
side the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, for present purposes, 
that in relation to audit practices the principle is relevant to par-
ticular aspects of an auditor’s functions, such as access to financial 
and accounting documents. The work of auditors is necessarily 
based on records held by auditees; access to information and docu-
ments is therefore crucial. 
Article 287(3) TFEU explicitly provides, in this respect, that “in-
stitutions of the Union, any bodies, offices or agencies managing 
revenue or expenditure on behalf of the Union, any natural or legal 
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person in receipt of payments from the budget, and the national au-
dit bodies […] shall forward to the [ECA], at its request, any docu-
ment or information necessary to carry out its task.”21 Thus, the 
question arises whether a request for information made by the ECA 
could be found to violate the principle of proportionality. 
In some cases, the accounting and reporting practices of public 
authorities as well as those of private companies make the gathering 
of certain specific information particularly burdensome. In this re-
spect, the relevant question to be asked is when a request to access 
information breaches the principle of proportionality, due to the fact 
that it is unreasonably difficult to access the information sought. 
In order to answer this important question one needs to look at the 
case law of the EU courts and, in the absence of any concrete cases 
relating specifically to the ECA, State aid law may be used to draw 
relevant analogies22. The Deutsche Post23 case concerned an inves-
tigation by the Commission into alleged aid received by Deutsche 
Post. While conducting its investigations the Commission addressed 
a formal decision to the German government ordering it to provide 
extensive information on that undertaking’s activities. The company 
brought an action for annulment before the EGC on the basis that 
the principle of proportionality had been infringed, since the request 
at issue required a disproportionate investment on its part in terms 
of time and effort. The EGC ruled that an institution can only re-
quest information that is relevant for the performance of its tasks 
which, in the case at hand, meant that the information requested had 
to be relevant to the assessment of whether the measure concerned 
                                                        
21 The Member States must cooperate in good faith with the ECA when 
it carries out an audit having a direct link to the powers conferred on it by 
Art. 287 TFEU (see ECJ, Commission v. Germany, C-539/09, 
EU:C:2011:733). 
22 In ECJ, Commission v. Germany, C-539/09, EU:C:2011:733, the Ad-
vocate General paid particular attention to the proportionality principle in 
ECA audits (points 87-92 and 123-140). However, the ECJ did not rule on 
this issue in its judgment. 
23 EGC, Deutsche Post v. Commission, T-570/08 RENV, 
EU:T:2013:589. 
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constituted State aid and whether that aid was compatible with the 
internal market24. An important point to be made here is that the 
relevance of the information requested is assessed at the moment 
when the request for information is made and not at a later stage of 
the procedure. Thus, in principle, auditors of the ECA may request 
information from private companies or public authorities in the 
course of their audit activities without violating the principle of pro-
portionality as long as it may reasonably be considered, at the time 
when the request is made, that the information at issue is relevant to 
the performance of their tasks. 
Bearing this in mind, compliance with the principle of propor-
tionality requires that, when requesting information from an under-
taking, the provision of that information should not place a dispro-
portionate burden on that undertaking, having regard to the objec-
tive needs of the investigation25. If, therefore, the request for infor-
mation relates to a minor correction of an amount, the auditors must 
have regard to the principle of proportionality and assess whether 
the request will create a disproportionate burden for the auditee. For 
example, where a week’s worth of man-hours would need to be ex-
pended in order to comply with a request and it is already apparent 
in advance that the correction at issue will amount, at most, to a 
paltry sum such as EUR 40, then it would be highly questionable 
whether that request could be reconciled with the principle of pro-
portionality. 
This simple example illustrates the fact that, like the principle of 
legal certainty, the principle of proportionality also has an impor-
tant role to play in audit activities, particularly with regard to issues 
of access to information and documents. The question is not so 
much whether this principle is applicable to the activities of audi-
tors - the answer is clearly yes - but rather to what extent auditors 
apply it in practice. It is desirable that auditors should have due re-
gard to this principle when requesting information, as it would 
                                                        
24 Ibid., para. 118. 
25 EGC, Slovak Telecom v. Commission, T-458/09 and T-171/10, 
EU:T:2012:145, para. 81. 
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make the use of EU funds more attractive for beneficiaries. Apply-
ing for and receiving EU subsidies is already a complex process and 
while auditing is vital in order to check that public money is being 
spent appropriately it should not have a chilling effect on the opti-
mal use of EU funding. Prospective beneficiaries may be dissuaded 
from applying for such funding in the first place if the auditing pro-
cedures, to which they are potentially subject ex post as recipients 
of EU grants, are unduly onerous. That is why the proper applica-
tion of the principle of proportionality is vital in order to make EU 
funding more attractive and less cumbersome for beneficiaries. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSPARENCY 
In accordance with Article 15(3) TFEU, each institution “shall en-
sure that its proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its 
own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its 
documents”. The rules which the ECA adopted in this regard26 aim 
to promote “good administrative practice on access to documents”27. 
As the preamble to ECA Decision No 12-2005 on access to docu-
ments indicates, “[o]penness enhances the [ECA’s] legitimacy, ef-
fectiveness and accountability, thus strengthening the principles of 
democracy”28. 
However, the principle of transparency has to be balanced against 
certain public and private interests. The ECA applies certain excep-
tions to the general rule of openness under Decision No 12-2005. 
These exceptions mostly correspond to those used by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission under Regulation 
                                                        
26 Article 30 of the ECA’s Rules of Procedure (OJ 2005 L 18/1) and De-
cision No 12-2005 of 10 March 2005 regarding public access to ECA 
documents, as amended by Decision No 14-2009. 
27 Decision No 12-2005, preamble, third recital. 
28 Ibid. 
830 K. Lenaerts / A. Brenninkmeijer 
 
 
No 1049/200129. The case law regarding the latter regulation is 
therefore relevant to the interpretation of the ECA’s rules on access 
to documents. 
The ECA will, inter alia, refuse access to a document where dis-
closure would undermine the execution of one of its audits30. This is 
likely to be the case when an audit is still ongoing31. By contrast, 
where the audit has been completed, the institution concerned will 
have to examine, in a concrete and individual manner, whether non-
disclosure of documents relating to the audit is still justified; this 
may be the case if an investigation other than the audit itself is still 
in progress which could be jeopardised by the disclosure32. 
When deciding whether or not to grant access to a particular docu-
ment, the ECA is also under a duty to respect the rights of individu-
als to privacy and to the protection of their personal data. These 
rights, which form an integral part of the general principles of EU 
law, are furthermore enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. For this reason, the ECA’s policy on access to 
documents33 provides that disclosure of a requested document will 
be refused where it would undermine the ‘privacy and the integrity 
                                                        
29 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145/43). 
30 Regulation No 1049/2001, Article 4(3). 
31 EGC, Technion and Technion Research & Development Foundation 
v. Commission, T-480/11, EU:T:2015:272, paras 59 and 65. 
32 See EGC, Franchet and Byk v. Commission, T-391/03, 
EU:T:2006:90, paras 110-124; EGC, Toland/Parliament, T-471/08, 
EU:T:2011:252, paras 42-58. These cases concerned requests for access to 
audit reports in circumstances where other investigations being undertaken 
by national authorities and by the internal services of the European Parlia-
ment, respectively, were still ongoing. However, Article 4(2) of ECA De-
cision No 12-2005 provides that the ECA “shall refuse access to its audit 
observations. It may also refuse access to documents used in the prepara-
tion of those observations”. Article 4(3) of this Decision further provides 
that the ECA “shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of […] inspections, investigations and audits”. 
33 Decision No 12-2005. 
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of the individual’34. That ECA Decision also makes reference to the 
EU legislation regarding the processing of personal data, i.e. Regu-
lation No 45/200135. 
ECA documents may indeed contain personal data, such as the 
names of individuals who were present at a particular meeting. 
There is potentially a tension between the provisions of ECA Deci-
sion No 12-2005 (‘the applicant is not obliged to state reasons for 
the application’)36 on access to documents and the provisions of 
Regulation No 45/2001, which imply that personal data can only be 
transferred to another person ‘if the recipient establishes the neces-
sity’ for that transfer37. However, it is only after the necessity re-
quirement set out in that latter Regulation has been met that ECA 
Decision No 12-2005 is applied and that the ECA will therefore 
proceed to examine whether the exception protecting the right to re-
spect for a person’s private life laid down in that Decision is rele-
vant. 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY  
AND PRINCIPLES OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION 
Merely making reference, in a document, to personal data such as 
the names of individuals is wholly different from criticising a per-
son’s behaviour. When conducting audits and subsequently publish-
ing reports on particular institutions or undertakings, there will, 
however, be instances where the particular behaviour of a given in-
dividual or of an institution as a whole is criticised. Such criticism 
may inevitably lead to reputational damage. So what are the rules 
that apply in situations of this type where such criticism is war-
                                                        
34 Decision No 12-2005 Article 4(1)(b).  
35 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bod-
ies and on the free movement of such data (OJ 2001 L 8/1). 
36 Decision No 12-2005, Article 5. 
37 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, Article 8(b). 
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ranted and what limits are placed on the findings that the ECA may 
publish in its reports? 
The Ismeri case38, in which the ECA was involved as a party to 
the proceedings, is directly relevant to that question. The case con-
cerned an action for damages for harm allegedly suffered by an 
auditee following criticisms made against him in a report of the 
ECA. According to the applicant, these criticisms were unfounded 
and the ECA should not have mentioned the applicant’s name in its 
report. In this context it becomes relevant to observe that the right 
to privacy is not absolute and that it can therefore be subject to re-
strictions. Such restrictions will, however, only be acceptable if 
they relate to objectives of general interest pursued by the Union 
and do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference 
which infringes upon the very substance of the rights protected39. 
The reporting of financial maladministration affecting the lawful-
ness of expenditure under the budget of the Union is one of the 
main tasks with which the ECA has been entrusted. The public in-
terest in reporting the full facts relating to such maladministration - 
including the names of those individuals directly involved - has to 
be weighed against the interference in the private life of these per-
sons that such publication will inevitably entail. The EGC decided 
in the Ismeri case that the ECA may - exceptionally - in the per-
formance of its tasks publish the name of any parties directly in-
volved in a serious case of financial maladministration. The naming 
of those involved is, according to the EGC, all the more necessary 
where a grant of anonymity might give rise to confusion or cast 
doubt on the identity of those concerned, which might harm the in-
terests of other persons involved in the investigation of the ECA but 
not implicated in the specific behaviour to which the critical assess-
                                                        
38 CFI, Ismeri Europa v. Court of Auditors, T-227/97, EU:T:1999:124, 
confirmed on appeal in ECJ, Ismeri Europa v. Court of Auditors, C-315/99 
P, EU:C:2001:391. 
39 ECJ, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, Joined Cases C-92/09 
and C-93/09, EU:C:2010:662, para. 65; CFI, M v. Ombudsman, T-412/05, 
EU:T:2008:397, para. 126. 
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ments at issue relate40. This ruling can be contrasted with another 
case, M v. Ombudsman, in which a report of the EU Ombudsman 
directly mentioned a particular official of the European Commis-
sion41. In that instance, the EGC decided, on the facts of that case, 
that it was not necessary for the Ombudsman to name the individual 
concerned in order to perform properly his tasks, nor, indeed, in 
order to avoid confusion of the sort mentioned above. It therefore 
came to the opposite conclusion to that reached in Ismeri. 
In any event, whenever the ECA, or indeed any other EU body, 
intends to adopt a decision which may perceptibly affect a person’s 
interests42 - by causing harm to his or her reputation for example - 
principles of good administration43 require that the person con-
cerned should be heard. That right aims to give the person affected 
the opportunity to exercise his or her rights of defence. In practice, 
this means that a person whose interests are at stake should have an 
opportunity to make observations before the audit report is defini-
tively adopted44. Any negative findings will be fully subject to re-
view by the EGC and may give rise to non-contractual liability of 
the EU if either the facts reported are not substantially correct or the 
interpretation placed on the facts, although they may be substan-
tively correct, is erroneous or one-sided45. 
Principles of good administration, besides involving the right to 
be heard, also encompass the right to have one’s affairs handled im-
partially, fairly and within a reasonable time. This important princi-
                                                        
40 CFI, Ismeri Europa v. Court of Auditors, T-277/97, EU:T:1999:124, 
para. 109. 
41 CFI, M v. Ombudsman, T-412/05, EU.T:2008:397, paras 129-131. 
42 See ECJ, Ismeri Europa v. Court of Auditors, C-315/99 P, 
EU:C:2001:391, para. 28; see also ECJ, M v. EMEA, C-197/09 RX-II, 
EU:C:2009:804, para. 41. 
43 Enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
44 ECJ, Ismeri Europa v. Court of Auditors, C-315/99 P, 
EU:C:2001:391, paras 29-32. 
45 CFI, Ismeri Europa v. Court of Auditors, T-277/97, EU:T:1999:124, 
para. 110. 
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ple of EU law has now been incorporated into the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights46. 
In the light of those requirements, audit principles at EU level 
provide for fact-finding procedures which are based on the ‘no sur-
prise’ principle and for two separate rounds of consultation of those 
concerned. In that regard, recital 61 in the preamble to the EU’s Fi-
nancial Regulation47 states that: 
 
‘The [ECA] should ensure that any of its findings that could have an 
impact on the final accounts of auditees or the legality or regularity of 
their underlying transactions, are transmitted to the institution or body 
concerned in good time in order to allow such auditees sufficient time 
to address those findings.’ 
 
The first consultation takes place after the fact finding during the 
audit in the form of a statement of preliminary findings - in prac-
tice, often by means of a letter setting out those findings - and the 
second on the basis of the draft report during the adversarial proce-
dure. The ECA’s audit focuses principally on the activities of the 
European Commission, but many other parties may also be in-
volved. Those parties are generally referred to as ‘the beneficiaries’ 
of EU funds, for instance a university in receipt of ‘Horizon 2020’ 
funds or a farmer benefiting from aid under EU programmes on ag-
riculture and rural development. Those parties are often subject to 
audits of the European Commission - sometimes carried out in 
practice by external private auditors hired by the Commission - and 
the ECA. Principles of good administration apply in both those 
situations. An analysis of the instructions given to auditors, for in-
stance the Financial and Compliance Audit Manual, calls for two 
contrasting and yet, ultimately, complementary, observations. On 
the one hand, the procedures and other rules governing audits are 
                                                        
46 Article 41, Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
47 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to 
the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 1605/2002. 
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set out in detail in such instructions. On the other hand, it is clear 
that a manual of this sort is not drafted specifically with legal prin-
ciples of good administration in mind. However, when one reads 
the manual in light of those principles, one can clearly identify the 
following elements that reflect ‘good administration’ practices, con-
cerning all of the three key stages of the process: the planning of the 
audit, the execution of the audit process itself and the subsequent 
reporting of the audit. For instance, the auditor should prepare all 
audit documentation on a timely basis. The audit process is sub-
mitted to systematic quality control. Professional judgment and 
scepticism should be exercised when planning as well as when per-
forming and reporting on audits. Sufficient, relevant and reliable 
audit evidence is also required in order to substantiate audit conclu-
sions. Moreover, as mentioned above, third parties receive protec-
tion if they are identified in a report. These expressions of princi-
ples of good administration in relation to audit practices illustrate 
the fact that general principles of EU law have an important role to 
play in the work of auditors, not least those working for the ECA. 
CONCLUSION 
What are the implications of general principles of EU law for au-
dit practice? This paper set out to provide some insight into those 
principles of law as they are relevant to auditors. Firstly, we have 
explained how general principles of EU law came into being and 
how they play out in the context of the audit activities of the ECA. 
General principles of EU law have an important role to play in the 
interpretation of legislation, forming the basis for judicial review as 
well as enabling the EU courts to fill in gaps left by the legislator. 
For example, in cases concerning access to information or the retro-
active application of rules, the principles of proportionality and le-
gal certainty are highly relevant both for auditors and for the bene-
ficiaries of EU funds. 
Despite the fact that audit standards are not, as such, specified by 
the EU legislator, general principles of EU law require that those 
standards be clear, precise and predictable in their effects. General 
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principles of EU law thus serve as guiding principles for audit ac-
tivities in helping to define principles of good audit.  
Auditors should apply general principles of EU law during the 
audit process and use them as a frame of reference in applying audit 
standards. Principles of good audit need to encompass a number of 
general principles of EU law. In order to form a sound professional 
judgment on the audit issue at hand, auditors need to look at 1) the 
text (i.e. the rules that should apply), 2) the context (in which these 
rules are used, taking into account any specific circumstances, where 
necessary and applicable) and 3) the intention of the rules (i.e. 
whether the rules were used in line with their overarching purpose 
and principles, including principles of good audit/administration).  
A proper application of the principle of the rule of law has the 
potential to improve the audit practice carried out in relation to EU 
funds by means of better interpretation of the applicable rules, 
through the promotion of transparency concerning the norms ap-
plied and by avoiding the imposition of unnecessary economic bur-
dens on business that may result from unpredictable audit out-
comes, or from disproportionate requests for detailed information. 
For beneficiaries of EU subsidies, the application of these general 
principles of EU law in audits is fundamental so that they may per-
ceive that they are being treated fairly and in order to develop a re-
lation of trust between auditor and auditee. For the European Union 
more generally, trust between European institutions and those 
whose affairs they administer, whether they are private citizens or 
economic undertakings, is key in gaining their support for the EU-
project. 
ABSTRACTS / RÉSUMÉS 
Audit in the EU is not only ruled by law but also by audit standards which 
stem from the international audit practice. What are the implications of 
general principles of EU law for audit practice? This paper sets out to pro-
vide some insights into those principles of law as they are relevant to audi-
tors. For example, in cases concerning access to information or the retro-
active application of rules, the principles of proportionality and legal cer-
tainty are highly relevant both for auditors and for the beneficiaries of EU 
 General Principles of EU Law and Audit Practice of EU Funds 837 
 
 
funds. For that reason auditors should apply general principles of EU law 
during the audit process and use them as a frame of reference in applying 
audit standards. Principles of good audit need to encompass a number of 
general principles of EU law. For beneficiaries of EU subsidies, the appli-
cation of these general principles of EU law in audits is fundamental so 
that they may perceive that they are being treated fairly and in order to 
develop a relation of trust between auditor and auditee. 
 
Au sein de l’UE, l’audit est régi par la loi mais aussi par les normes d’audit 
qui dérivent de la pratique internationale. Quelles implications les prin-
cipes généraux du droit de l’Union ont-ils sur la pratique de l’audit? Cet ar-
ticle présente quelques aspects de ces principes de droit qui sont pertinents 
pour les auditeurs. Par exemple, dans un cas concernant l’accès à l’infor-
mation ou l’application rétroactive de règles, les principes de proportionna-
lité et de sécurité juridique sont hautement pertinents pour les auditeurs et 
pour les bénéficiaires de fonds européens. C’est pourquoi les auditeurs 
doivent appliquer les principes généraux du droit de l’Union durant la pro-
cédure d’audit et les utiliser comme cadre de référence dans l’application 
des normes d’audit. Les principes de bon audit doivent inclure un certain 
nombre de principes généraux du droit de l’Union. Pour les bénéficiaires 
de fonds européens, la mise en œuvre de ces principes généraux du droit 
de l’Union lors des audits est fondamentale pour qu’ils aient le sentiment 
d’être traités équitablement et pour développer une relation de confiance 
entre auditeur et audité. 
F. Vogin 
